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Wilfredo Nuqui*
I. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES
The traditional role of the state as provider, enabler, and regulator has changed all over the 
world. Many states, including the Philippines’s, embraced economic liberalization in the 1980s 
and even more so in the 1990$. Policy changes affected the financial, production and utilities 
sectors.
Electric-power generation and distribution (EPGD) was most affected. EPGD is a traditional 
instrument of economic growth increasingly tapped to serve regional development, social equity, 
and other objectives. The deregulation of the EPGD sector will promote greater investment, 
economy, and increased private-sector participation under a competitive and healthy 
environment; simplification and procedural streamlining regulations will be valuable to 
investors.
According to the Office of Energy Affairs (OEA), installed power-generating capacity as of 
end 1991 was 6,790 megawatt-hours (MGH) distributed as follows:
Installed capacity % Utilization
UTILITY
National Power Corporation 
Oil/Diesel*
Hydro
Geothermal
Coal
3,112.20
2,132.00
888.00
405.00
36.30
27.52
74.43
55.28
Rural Electric Cooperatives 
Oil/Diesel*
Hydro
Sub-total
69.83
22.86
92.69
0.84
15.03
4.34
Private Utilities 
Oil/Diesel* 
Sub-total
159.00
159.00 
6,788.89
10/78
10.78
38.63GRAND TOTAL
'''Deputy Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority
2These facilities include a variety of generating units such as 506 MW of land-based gas 
turbines, 6 MW of minihydro plants, and 12 MW of diesel generating units mainly on small 
islands. The energy-generation mix is 31.6 percent oil, 22.4 percent geothermal, 20.1 percent 
hydro, and 22.4 percent from other sources -  gas turbine (7.9 percent), coal (7.6 percent), and 
diesel (3.4 percent).
In terms of electric generation by grid, 76.1 percent is in Luzon, 14.7 percent in Mindanab, 
and 9.3 percent in the Visayas. Four projects involving an aggregate capacity of 1,222 MW are 
confirmed under the Government Private Power Generation Program. Expected to be operational 
by 1993 are the 300-MW Bataan combined-cycle plant, 12-MW Makban Binary Geothermal 
Plant, and 210-MW Mindanao Power Project. A 700-MW Hopewell Thermal Plant is expected 
to operate at half capacity in 1995 and projected to be fully operational by 1997.
The energy-generation plans seem impressive, but they mask a number of critical issues:
(a) the inadequacy, unreliability, and high cost of power generation; (b) the lack of electricity in 
many rural areas and households, and for other potential users; and (c) structural and 
policy-induced impediments that prevent solving (a) and (b).
Given an estimated elasticity of power demand relative to GNP of 1.2-1.5, energy supply 
has failed to keep up with the average annual economic growth of 4.5 percent in 1986-90. The 
consequences are occasional but unpredictable and economically costly outages. The delayed 
installation of more cheaply sourced hydro and geothermal plants and the environmental 
deterioration of natural-energy sources has also resulted in more expensive electricity. NPC 
power tariffs increased by P0.22/kilowatt-hour (KWH) in January 1992 despite an appreciating 
peso and relatively cheaper oil-product inputs.
Rural electric distributors, notably rural electric cooperatives (RECs), which deliver 
electricity to 53 percent of all users, face problems similar to those of the government’s National 
Power Corporation (NPC). In 1990, RECs suffered system losses of 21.7 percent, but had a 
collection efficiency of 90 percent and increased their amortization to NEA to P269 million 
from an average of P190 million/year in 1988-89. Many RECs confront financial losses, stalled 
expansion programs, and deteriorating customer service.
The economic-stabilization plan has slightly exacerbated an already difficult situation. 
Government provision of the required equity capital to its power-generation utility and the 
National Electrification Administration (NEA) is constrained by a restrictive public-sector 
budget-deficit target Rate adjustments are circumscribed by political and social resistance. 
Official development assistance (ODA) intended for the public sector has to be shared with the 
private sector, which has lost access to foreign commercial credit. The share of investments in 
EPGD in total public-sector investments declined to 19 percent in 1986-90 from a high of 30 
percent in 1975-85 or, as a proportion of GNP, from 2 to 1.2 percent. In sum, the EPGD sector is 
a victim of higher macroeconomic priorities, poor sector planning, and operating inefficiencies.
A comprehensive structural-adjustment program started in the early 1980s with financial 
and other reforms. The government introduced elements of a parallel reform program affecting 
EPGD: (a) the design of a least-cost power-development program; (b) the decision to adopt the 
long-run marginal-cost (LRMC) pricing principle; (c) the demonopolization and partial
3privatization of electric-power generation; and (d) other reforms such as more market-related 
pricing of petroleum products.
For the EPGD sector to contribute to economic adjustment, government must examine 
existing policies, whether the product of legislated or administrative regulations (or both) that 
obstruct the increase in power supply: entry and production issues; reduction of the costs, by 
addressing allocative and operating efficiency issues; and the expansion of physical coverage, 
which involves access and equity. The roles and performance of NPC, NEA, and RECs should 
be redefined and improved by addressing institutional-arrangement issues. Underlying these 
broad issues are sectoral and other concerns such as the implications on foreign investments, the 
natural environment and host communities, and linkages with other macro, sectoral, and micro 
policies and objectives.
In a larger context, the fundamental issue is defining the regulatory role of the state in the 
economy in general, and the EPGD sector in particular. The government must refurbish its 
negative image through economic liberalization -- privatization and deregulation -  if its 
increasingly limited power to intervene is to be felt. A sound mix of market-friendly policies 
and human- and physical-capital investments demands an assessment of regulations governing 
the EPGD sector. EPGD output is not internationally tradeable; it is necessary to create domestic 
competition to secure privileges to operate and subject them to standards of performance in a 
controlled public-utility policy setting.
This paper has two objectives. The first is to examine the existing regulatory framework 
governing the EPGD sector and its broad macro and micro implications, including transmission 
mechanisms. The second is to identify certain issues and areas where deregulation, through 
increased reliance on market forces will strengthen the linkage and identify the propagation 
mechanisms between EPGD and industry, the informal and other sectors, in meeting national 
objectives. Other component studies deal with (a) macro-economic analysis, (b) monitoring, (c) 
agriculture, (d) natural resources and environment, (e) industrial and informal sectors, (g) social 
services, and (h) impacts on women.
This study consists of five parts. After the introduction, Part II reviews the economics of 
regulation, covering the basis for government economic intervention, the objective of 
regulation, the concepts and tools of economic regulation, the role of regulation in a 
development context, and the case for deregulation. Part III analyzes recent deregulation policies 
and measures in selected sectors — agriculture, finance, transportation, and telecommunications 
-  and their general trends and implications, particularly in shaping a more competitive 
economic environment Part IV presents a general framework for analyzing the economic and 
other issues in EPGD sector: linkage with energy-source development, electricity pricing, and 
institutional issues. Part V examines the regulatory environment in the EPGD sector and 
describes the roles of the major institutional participants -  the principal regulators and market 
players. It then comments on promotional policies and specific laws and administrative rules 
affecting entrants and incumbent producers and distributors, on factors affecting efficiency, on 
pricing, and on other regulations, such as safety and reporting. In particular, it analyzes the roles 
of the NPC, NEA, and RECs in the development of the EPGD sector.
4n . REVIEW OF THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION
A. The Basis for Government Intervention
Governments not only pursue political ideologies but also implement public policies needed 
to guide, correct, and supplement maiket conditions. The following are some reasons why public 
policy remains essential (Musgrave 1990; Krongkaew 1991).
1) The claim that the market mechanism leads to efficient resources use — that is, 
produces what consumers want most and does so in the cheapest way -  is based 
on competitiveness and product markets: there must be no obstacle to free entry, 
and consumers and producers must have full market information. Government 
regulation or other forms of intervention may have to establish these conditions.
2) Public policy may be needed where competition is inefficient and wasteful due to 
decreasing costs.
3) The contractual arrangements and exchanges needed for maiket operation cannot 
exist without the protection and enforcement of a legal structure (Donges 1991).
4) Even if barriers to competition are removed, the production or consumption 
characteristics of certain goods cannot be provided by the market. Problems of 
mostly negative “ externalities”  arise, leading to “ market failure”  that requires 
correction through budgetary provisions, subsidy, tax penalty, or other means.
5) Social values may require adjustments in the distribution of income and wealth 
resulting from the market system and transmission of property rights through 
inheritance.
6) The maiket system, even in developed economies, does not necessarily bring 
about high employment, price stability, or the socially desired rate of economic 
growth. Public policy can cushion external shocks transmitted through open 
economies that often make the attainment of desired economic objectives 
difficult.
7) Public or social and private points of view on the rate of discount used in the 
valuation of future (relative to present) consumption may differ.
John Paul It’s encyclical on economics, Centesimus Annus, argues for a “ free economy” 
and state intervention only in exceptional circumstances to check the expansive ambitions of 
government Such interventions must be as brief as possible to avoid taking away from society 
and business systems their functions and excessively enlarging the sphere of state intervention 
to the detriment of economic and civil freedom. This insight is based on the principles of giving 
priority to the individual, his free associations and society, and subsidiarity or minimum 
interference in the internal life of a community of lower order.
5B. The Objective of Regulation^
In justifying intervention through regulation, governments cite economic distortions and 
market failures, which result in misallocadon of resources, excessive profits, decline in quality 
of goods and services, and exploitation of labor. Regardless of the motive, regulatory 
intervention can be justified from an economic standpoint only if the social benefits exceed the 
costs tp the consumer. Specifically, government interventions should fulfill three basic 
functions:
1) allocation -  the government helps allocate public goods that tiie market fails to 
provide;
2) distribution -  the government helps adjust the distribution of income and wealth 
to ensure conformity with what society considers “ fair”  or “just” ;
3) stabilization -  the government helps maintain high employment, a reasonable 
degree of price-level stability, and an appropriate rate of economic growth, with 
allowances for effects on trade and the balance of payments.
In democratic societies, governments exercise various interventions to achieve these broad 
objectives through elected representatives.
The above account is the orthodox economic justification for government involvement in 
the economy (Musgrave 1990). A more recent rationale takes a deeper look at the meaning and 
ramifications of market failures as they provide a set of reasons for government activity. 
According to Stiglitz (1988) and Krongkaew, for example, six circumstances of market failure 
prevent the market from reaching Pareto optimality or efficiency.
1) Failure o f competition. Resources are allocated inefficiently. When the market is 
not competitive because there are too few firms or too many barriers to entry 
arising from increasing returns to scale, a natural monopoly results. Then 
consumers suffer restricted output and higher prices.
2) Public good. Some goods are either not supplied by the market, or supplied in 
insufficient quantity because they are characterized by joint consumption and 
nonexcludability. Examples of these goods are national defense and navigational 
aids, which can only be provided by the government.
3) Externalities. Externalities are said to occur when the actions of one individual or 
firm affect other individuals or firms without appropriate costs or compensations 
applied to those actions. The occurrence of externalities, therefore, connotes 
allocative inefficiency which justifies government’s interventions to “ internalize” 
those externalities: that is, to put proper prices on those externalities, or control 
them with regulations.
1. This section and the next draw mostly on United Nations (1983); Krongkaew (1991); and Donges (1991).
64) Incomplete markets. There are certain goods and services that the private markets 
fail to provide even though the cost of providing them is less than what 
individuals are willing to pay: this is the case in incomplete markets. Insurance 
and loans fit the above description: the private market does not provide insurance 
for many important risks that individuals face, or for certain loans. As a result, the 
government may have to provide the facilities for bank-deposit insurance, and 
student loans for higher education, or agricultural or small-business loans.
5) Information failures. TTie private market may fail to provide complete information 
to consumers, thus creating inefficiency in the transaction. The government may 
step in to remedy the information failures (or inadequacies) on behalf of the 
consumers. But it may go beyond this since information is, in many respects, a 
public good. A weather report is a case in point
6) Unemployment, inflation and disequilibrium. As high unemployment is the worst 
of market failures, government should steer the economy away from 
unemployment inflation, and other economic disequilibria.
In a developing country, the government is justified in intervening in investment, 
capital-formation, infrastructure building, and services — all of which will make private 
economic activities viable. Many governments in developing countries employ 
domestic-resource mobilization measures such as taxing one sector more than others or 
mobilizing foreign resources through foreign borrowings and transfers. Economic planning 
ensures that the measures are implemented in an orderly, systematic manner.
Development objectives do not necessarily cover only economic growth and expansion; they 
can include poverty alleviation, reduction of income inequality, environmental preservation, and 
enhancement of the overall “ quality of life” (Krongkaew 1991). The approach, scope, technique, 
and organization for economic regulation vary among countries. In any case, caution must be 
exercised so that market failures do not result in government failures in regulation (WDR 1991).
The wide divergence in regulatory policies and approaches among countries is conditioned 
by ideological considerations of the role of the state, tradition, public attitude toward the value 
of competition and how to curb abuses, and what is considered the public interest. In addition to 
differences in approach and scope of regulation, there are significant contrasts in the regulatory 
techniques and organization. These range from independent regulatory bodies or commissions 
made up of neutral experts to legislative oversight bodies and regulatory agencies within, or 
closely supervised by, government. Thus, regulations are prescribed and enforced by state and 
local laws, the courts, state legislative and regulatory bodies, and local government units.
Since a regulatory administration enforces standards and follows procedures, its form and 
scope are strongly affected by the form and nature of the legal system. The legal and 
administrative systems, such as the civil service, affect the form of the regulatory agency, its 
manner of operation, and relationship to the rest of government It also affects the kind of staff 
personnel hired, compensation, and their training.
In the US, whose jurisprudence influences that of the Philippines, regulation often provides 
the establishment of independent regulatory commissions, quasijudicial and quasilegislative
7bodies. So as to uphold the principles of check and balance, and due process, judicial review of 
the bodies’ actions is often required.
C. Concepts and Tools o f Economic Reguluuan
Regulation has been defined, as ‘'‘the intentional restriction of choice by a party not directly 
involved in or performing, the regulated activity” (Mitnick 1980). More specifically, it involves 
activities which achieve the following: (a) affect the operating business environment of private 
enterprise, including market entry and exit, rate, price and profit structures, and competition; (b) 
control specific services or products through permit, certification, or licensing requirements as 
provided by law or policy; and (c> relate to the development, administration, and enforcement of 
national standards normally done by a designated public agency.
Control can be formally imposed through a defined scope of .functions and authorities. 
Proper authority is often prescribed and conveyed through (a) corporate charters; (b) a franchise 
which often is legislated and with a timeframe, (c) the .grant of certificate; permit or license, and 
(d) a certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) as in the case of transport utilities.
Regulation is only one of the four major modalities^by which governments intervene. The 
others are promotion, direct management, and planning. Governments offer a wide range .of 
incentives and subsidies, such as tax holidays, cheap credit, and protective tariffs to promote 
selected sectors and industries. In other countries, . in addition to or , in lieu of regulation, 
governments themselves own and manage various economic activities either directly or through 
public-sector enterprises. In many developing countries1, governments are involved in planning 
socioeconomic development although many centrally planned economies are ndw shifting 
toward some variants of market-oriented economic systems.
D. Regulation in the Development Context1,
Regulation, either in its control (negative) or promotional (positive) form, has direct bearing 
on economic development. The literature oh the economics of regulation, which used to be 
theoretically oriented, has been enriched by recent experience in the Pacific region (see Japan 
Committee for Pacific Economic Outlook Report 1990). The theoretical1, rationale, and practical 
experiences are dominated by four-arguments: (a) avoidance of unfair monopolistic practices and 
opportunistic behavior; (b) protection of infant industries (c) minimization of the ill-effects of 
excessive and often-destructive competition; and (d) promotion of public safety and health and 
protection of the environment Conversely, a large body of research and arguments calls for 
structural adjustment by combining standard macroeconomic policy reforms and deregulation.
The argument for monopoly assumes that because of the huge capital involved and to 
achieve economies of scale it is socially desirable to have just one or a few firms operating.To be 
sure, industries with natural monopoly characteristics are not all subject to economies of scale. 
In most cases, it is possible and* efficient to separate networks of economic activities where 
regulation is justifiable frehft other operations that can be opened to competition.
2. This and following sections draw mainly on Hanis (1991).
8Deregulation seeks to break monopolies by vertical or horizontal disintegration, such as 
through the structural separation of the energy-development, electric-power generation, 
transmission, and distribution components of an electric power system. For instance, 
electric-power generation can be deregulated while continuing the regulation of transmission as a 
common carrier and local distribution through a geographically dispersed system of franchised 
or licensed monopolies. This model can have an analogous application in the telecommunications 
and airline sectors where local distribution and operation can be directly separated from major 
trunkline operation.
In cases where a monopoly is supported by policy, whether the facilities are publicly owned 
or not, the right to operate can be bidded out regularly to create positive tension and adequate 
competition. In cases where the monopoly is granted to a private operator, its ownership 
structure can be democratized through public listing of its shares. Monopoly conditions, 
therefore, can be governed by various forms of public and private ownership and management 
arrangements. Conversely, antitrust legislation can make such acts as price-fixing and market 
division illegal by applying either the “ per se” or “ rule of reason” principle.
The argument for protecting infant industries, sometimes called “ industrial targeting,” 
which is most applicable for tradeables, provides for either tariff or nontariff barriers. This 
argument, however, has lost much theoretical appeal due to the success of open economies in 
dealing with greater international interdependence and managing external shocks by encouraging 
export-oriented and world-competitive industries.
Excessive competition and attendant price-cutting may result in poor services and products. 
They are likely to occur in industries where entry is easy, exit or disposition of assets difficult, 
and marginal costs very much below average costs (Harris 1991). It can also take place in an 
industry where fixed costs may be high but marginal costs low. Under such circumstances, firms 
can not make sufficient profits, public health and safety are jeopardized, and old facilities and 
equipment not likely to be replaced. The purpose of regulation, which emphasizes control on 
entry and pricing, manages competition, ensuring profitable operations and better service.
That government should promote public health, safety and the environment is a given. The 
major challenge in safeguarding these social goods is in setting adequate and enforceable 
standards, particularly in a developing economy where stringent and costly standards can 
discourage new investments. Regulatory bodies in many developing countries will not or can not 
assess ex-ante and ex-post conditions, enforce standards, or monitor compliance, especially in 
industries where technology is rapidly advancing or new technology is about to be introduced, 
such as in nuclear energy or telecommunications.
E. The Case for Deregulation
Harris defines deregulations as wholesale change in public policies toward an industry, with 
greater reliance on market forces and competition and less reliance on administrative guidance. 
Some argue that deregulation is not an end in itself, but a means of freeing individual creativity, 
stimulating private initiatives, and widening the range of consumer options (Donges 1991).
9Deregulation in various countries has created firms and workers who are either winners or 
losers. Safety regulations should be improved to mitigate excessive competition. The experience 
of the US and other countries warn those embarking on deregulation to carefully manage the 
following: (a) potential changes in demand (changing relative prices) and composition of supply 
(shifts in factor substitution); (b) the process of transition; and (c) the effects on the balance of 
payments, labor skills, and the need for training and social safety nets for those adversely 
affected.
The World Development Report (WDR 1991) recognizes the complexity of pacing and 
sequencing stabilization policies that often include some form of deregulation, such as decontrol 
of prices and user rates. While swift reforms may neutralize the resistance of adversely affected 
groups, more gradual reforms may allow time to address their concerns.
In recent years, state economic managers, even those in previously centrally planned 
economies, have come to value competition. The WDR highlights some of the current thinking, 
noting that some exchange-rate, trade, and pricing policies are harmful. Industries are especially 
hurt by barriers to entry and exit, price controls, and administrative allocation of credit. The 
report further argues the following: (a) competitive markets are still the best way to efficiently 
organize the production and distribution of goods and services; and (b) governments must 
provide a legal and regulatory framework that will address market failures and inadequacies. The 
report also notes the dramatic success of the synergy between investments in human and physical 
capital on the one hand, and an open and competitive policy environment on the other.
m . RECENT DEREGULATION IN SOME SELECTED SECTORS
Electric-power generation (EPG) is a major component of integrated energy planning and 
development, with profound macroeconomic implications. It has a two-way relationship with 
other sectors: those providing such inputs as physical infrastructures, energy resources, credit, 
etc.; and industries and households availing of its output. Public policies and deregulation 
measures in such sectors as agriculture, natural resources, public utilities, and finance have direct 
or indirect implications on EPG.
A. Agriculture
Deregulation in agriculture since the early 1980s sought the phasing out of price and 
quantitative controls as well as levies and taxes, and elimination of barriers to entry. The results 
of such deregulation are as follows: (a) lifting of the copra export ban and export taxes on 
coconut oil and other agricultural products; (b) abolition of monopsonistic arrangements in sugar 
and coconut trading; (c) liberalization of fertilizer importation and distribution; (d) removal of 
retail price ceilings on rice, poultry products and pork; (e) opening of import trade in wheat, 
wheat products, and animal feeds to the private sector, (f) changing the primary function of the 
National Food Authority from nongrain activities to price stabilization of rice and com; (g) 
ending direct lending programs and the consolidation of separate commodity-specific funds into 
the Comprehensive Agricultural Loan Fund; and (h) institutional reforms affecting various 
agencies involved in agriculture (Balisacan 1991).
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Balisacan argues, based on a methodology using household income and expenditure, that the 
benefits of the deregulation in agriculture, expressed in terms of the reduction in overall 
measured poverty in agriculture, could have been substantial. However, he pointed out, high 
population growth has contributed to environmental degradation of agricultural areas and exerted 
downward pressure on real wages. The effects of this factor on farm incomes and poverty should 
be distinguished from the generally positive effect of agricultural-deregulation policy.
B. Financial Sector
Financial liberalization took place in 1980 and 1986. The 1980 financial reforms sought to 
foster competition in the financial markets and improve the availability of medium- and 
long-term funds to the industrial sector (Lamberte 1991). The reforms touched pricing policies 
for various financial assets and the structure of the financial system. Interest-rate ceilings on all 
types of deposits and loans were lifted.
Meanwhile, differentiation among banks was reduced so that banks of different types could 
compete with each other. Rules on equity investments in allied and nonallied activities were 
relaxed so that financial institutions could compete in various areas of banking and finance either 
through their own departments or affiliates. Minimum capital requirements for the different 
bank categories were raised to strengthen banks in this new competitive environment. The 
reforms, while noteworthy, had mixed results due to the negative effects of external shocks, the 
domestic economic crisis, and absence of complementary reforms.
In 1986, the Aquino government initiated a series of financial reforms involving the 
following: (a) more liberal bank entry and branching; (b) increased inter-bank competition with 
the encouragement of a higher paid-up capital requirement for universal banks (PI billion), 
ordinary commercial banks (P500 million), and thrift banks (up to P50 million) in order to 
accept foreign-cunency deposits; (c) improved prudential policies and regulations by the 
Central Bank (CB) to address insider abuse, etc.; (d) adoption of a uniform, market-oriented 
rediscount rate by the CB, which effectively ended its selective credit-control policy; and (e) the 
definition of a clearer role for government financial institutions (GFIs), e.g., wholesale banking 
by Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to avoid competition with the private bankers, 
and the privatization of the Philippine National Bank (PNB).
Lamberte’s analysis of financial liberalization from 1977 to 1988 reveals several things.
1) Commercial banks have been allocating credit inefficiently to other sectors. For 
example, the ratio of loans outstanding to the gross value-added in electricity, 
gas, and water has been declining.
2) The Philippines had the highest lending rate on bank loans and the most volatile 
real interest rates in the ASEAN region in 1977-88.
3) Access of small or marginal borrowers to bank credit remains limited due to 
nonprice credit rationing arising from inadequate or imperfect information.
4) Remaining special-credit programs should focus on a few sectors, such as 
export-oriented industries.
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5) The debt-securities or bond markets remain underdeveloped.
The proportional reduction of commercial credit to the electricity, gas, and water sectors 
could have stemmed from the relatively larger demand of these sectors for foreign loans and the 
lack of incentives to expand due to inappropriate policies, such as legal and administrative 
restrictions on new entry and utility rates, and maiket constraints.
C. Transportation
In transportation, the one-airline policy for international and domestic operation was 
revoked on 16 August 1986, allowing the entry of other air carriers, particularly in domestic 
operations where the need is most acute. On 8 October 1990, the Land Transportation, 
Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) allowed upgrading of existing bus fleets by 
airconditioning up to 100 percent of regular units. Summary procedures are now being adopted 
in the review of applications for additional units under subsisting certificates of public 
convenience and necessity (CPCNs). Cargo-handling services in each of the 15 government 
ports were demonopolized on 21 June 1990. In the meantime, privatization of Philippine Airlines 
was implemented after the national government assumed its foreign debt to enhance the 
corporation’s market value.
On 12 November 1990, MARINA fully or partially decontrolled various transport-fare rates 
either by deregulating the first- and second-class shipping passenger fares and the rates of 
livestock, transit and refrigerated cargoes, and by setting a +/- 15-percent fare range for third-class 
passengers. On 14 December 1990, LFTRB allowed a +/-15-percent fare range on interurban bus 
services except in Metro Manila. Trucking freight rates are no longer set by the LTFRB.
LTFRB has further delegated to its Regional Managers the authority to (a) approve fare rates 
for motorized tricycles, and (b) decide on certain cases involving interregional petitions for 
dropping and substitution. MARINA is at present assessing the possible effects of the partial 
decontrol of the fork-tariff system and the total deregulation of cargo rates on low-cargo density 
routes, vessel selection, and the liner industry structure.
DOTC is pushing for a law that will abolish the distinction between private (T) and for hire 
(TH) trucks to deregulate entry, route allocation, and pricing restrictions. It is also pushing for 
the removal of the 3-percent common-carrier tax (CCT) for public road-transport vehicles and 
replacing it with a road-user tax.
D. Telecommunications
The DOTC and National Telecommunication Commission (NTQ are pursuing a policy of 
practicable deregulation through the gradual reduction of burdens and requirements (e.g., barrier 
to entry and price control) and the devolution of regulatory powers to regional offices and local 
government units (LGUs).
Satellite communication via satellite earth stations and very small aperture terminals 
(VSATs), and cellular mobile telephone services have been opened up to allow the freer entry of 
service providers catering tp telecommunication users. Long- distance voice services have 
likewise been demonopolized. The Secretary of Justice also reportedly ruled that Executive Order
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(EO) 546 authorizes NTC to issue operating permits to radio and television broadcasting 
operators without the prior expressed grant to franchise by Congress.
In order to facilitate deregulation, DOTC also issued Circular 90-248 which provides for the 
following:
1) Interconnection of all facilities offering public telecommunication services based 
on NTC standards and guidelines governing transmission, switching and 
signalling interfaces, revenue-and-cost sharing and other matters;
2) Promotion of rapid communication in all regions under the Municipal Telephone 
Act of 1989 (RA 6849) with the grant of the right of first option to qualified 
private operators to set up public calling stations; and
3) Sharing with the private sector ODA which was previously available only to the 
public sector. RA 6957 (Build-Operate-Transfer Law) complements this policy by 
enabling interested investors to get access to long-term credit and foreign 
exchange.
Meanwhile, a new bill on telecommunication deregulation (SN 1353) is being pursued to 
provide for the following:
1) Deregulation of value added and enhanced services, wireless services, and 
intemational-service rates;
2) The promotion of at least two operators to put up and maintain a national tool or 
backbone system with adequate capability to provide voice, record, and data 
services;
3) Replacement of the 12-percent retum-on-operating-assets rule with a more 
realistic market-based rate; and
4) Withdrawal of government in the direct operation of telecommunication services.
DOTC is formulating the implementing guidelines for the privatization of 
government-owned and acquired telecommunications assets, which could broaden the ownership 
of the national-backbone transmission network to a manageable number.
E. Trends and Implications
It is too early to assess the results of deregulation measures in various sectors, particularly in 
transportation and telecommunications. However, certain trends, conditions, and implications, 
including those arising from liberalization and deregulation in the agriculture and financial 
sectors, are noticeable. First, relaxation of entry conditions encourages a more liberal 
rate-setting policy due to the general decline or stability of utility rates occasioned by greater 
competition. This trend, however, has not been observed in the banking sector in the form of 
higher deposit rates or lower lending rates due to the persistence of an informal cartel among 
banks and the remnants of financial repression, such as intermediation taxes.
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Second, the public will mote readily accept deregulation of utility rates if or when energy, 
other input supplies, and prices are stable. Third, public policies can help manage the transition 
process by, for example, extending ODA-sourced credits to utilities and other sectors undergoing 
rehabilitation or acquiring new equipment
Fourth, deregulation in some sectors, such as finance, should be complemented by parallel 
reforms in the productive sector. Otherwise, credit and other resources will not necessarily flow 
or be allocated most efficiently. Domestic credit will not go to EPG if entry is highly restricted. 
The reallocation of resources is likewise a function of die cross elasticity and time path of 
adjustment of different sectors to macro and sector-specific policy changes, deregulation, and 
other stimuli. Conversely, freer entry to EPG will not lead to full tapping of domestic credit if 
loan rates are high or if the debt- security market is constrained by restricted competition.
Fifth, political will to pursue and popular acceptance of deregulation and other 
economic-liberalization initiatives is imperative.
Sixth, external pressures and conditions — such as those imposed by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in exchange for adjustment loans, e.g„ Agricultural 
Input loan and Energy Sector loan — also involuntarily facilitate deregulation, although 
probably with less positive impact if only grudgingly carried out
The 1992 Local Government Code devolves to LGUs a number of services and promotional 
and regulatory functions such as granting of franchises, taxation, etc. There is some risk of 
reverting to a decentralized regulation-oriented regime if LGUs do not exercise their functions 
with a more open attitude, particularly in simplifying policies and rules, and creating a more 
favorable investment climate for the private sector.
IV. A GENERAL FRAMEWORK
This section provides a framework for analyzing the implications of public intervention 
policies, including regulations on the electric-power system or network and subsequently, on 
households.
A. Policy Instruments and Constraints
Five policy instruments can, if properly orchestrated help develop an optimal energy 
management strategy: (a) physical controls such as load sharing; (b) technical methods, such as 
use of cost-effective technologies; (c) direct investment projects; (d) education and promotion; 
and (e) pricing, taxes, subsidies and other incentives (Kumar and Munasinghe 1987). On the 
other hand, there are chief constraints: (a) a poor institutional framework; (b) inadequate policy 
instruments; (c) lack of analytical tools, such as electric-pricing model; and (d) insufficient 
manpower and other resources, particularly of the regulatory body. The broad implications of 
these strategies, policies, and constraints are analyzed below.
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B. The Electric Power System*
An electric-power system should supply consumers -  households, institutions, and industries 
— at the power level, time, place, and quality of service that they desire. Quality of service 
includes reliability, safety, and other factors.
A simplified power system operates as follows. Initially, the output from a generation plant 
is fed into transmission facilities whose main components are power transformers, high- voltage 
transmission lines, and transmission substations. At the transmission substations, the voltage can 
be stepped up to extra high and electric power carried further by transmission lines. It is then fed 
into another substation which can reduce the voltage before feeding the electric power through 
transmission lines to the distribution facilities, which are mainly distribution substations, 
primary feeders, distribution transformers, and secondary lines.
The voltage of the electric power received from the transmission facilities is reduced at the 
distribution substations, which arc located near the load points or centers. Primary feeders 
evacuate power flows from distribution-station bus bars to distribution transformers where the 
voltage is reduced again. The consumer receives electric power from a secondary distribution 
line, a service inlet, and a meter.
Even such a simple system requires many complicated components from generation or 
injection point to load or extract point. A power system is generally much more complex, with 
many generating points linked to many load points through an interconnected transmission 
network. The distribution facilities or a single load point, however, can serve thousands of 
consumers.
C. Maximizing Power System Benefits
In general, the process of maximizing net benefits for the power system as a whole can be 
decomposed into four modules. First, given the existing power-system configuration and the 
load and energy demands associated with an electricity tariff forecast, alternative 
system-expansion plans and their costs can be simulated. Second, the least-cost system-expansion 
plan is determined along with the associated long-run marginal cost of supply. Third, given the 
energy demands used in determining the least-cost expansion plan, cost-benefit analysis is 
undertaken to judge the economic viability of the least-cost investment plan. Fourth, the 
marginal cost of supply is compared with the electricity-tariff forecast to revise the latter on the 
basis of which a new load and energy demand forecast is prepared, incorporating the tariff 
change.
The process described above is repeated until an investment plan emerges where electricity 
tariff and LRMC are equal. An efficient and economically viable power-sector investment plan 
will emerge where the interaction of the demand forecast, investment decision, and the 
accompanying LRMC of supply is explicitly accounted for.
3. This section draws on Ali (1991).
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This approach has to undergo a second stage in order to reflect financial, political, and other 
social factors in the computed-tariff levels.
Financial criteria based on (a) a target financial rate of return on existing assets or future 
investments and (b) self-financing by the utility, i.e., ratio of internally generated funds available 
after operating expenses and debt service to capital expenditures, must address practical 
problems. These include asset revaluation and the distribution of the revenue burden.
A practical, although not economically efficient, method is retaining the basic, structure of 
LRMC tariff and vary the rate by equiproportional changes among users. The other is applying 
the Barmol-Bradford inverse-elasticity rule that provides that the greatest (or least) divergence 
from strict LRMC occurs for the consumer group and rating period where the price elasticity is 
lowest (or highest). It is the most satisfactory adjustment procedure from the viewpoint of 
economic efficiency (Munasinghe and Rungta 1984).
In general, therefore, the pricing of generated electricity is dictated by efficiency, equity, and 
cost recovery or rate of return objectives. Cost factors include the source mix, time of day, and 
the location and type of consumer. Efficiency considerations are the need to use energy 
judiciously, the need to be internationally competitive, and the official policy on the role of 
electricity pricing in managing demand and promoting certain sectors, such as low-income 
households and small-scale and rural-based industries. Equity is pursued through administered 
pricing of petroleum products with bias toward power generating and other industries producing 
basic goods and services, and subsidizing electricity to low-income households or localities. 
Financial and other performance targets must consider both equity and efficiency objectives in 
its pricing structure.
D. External Environment and Macroeconomic Policies
Changes in the world economy have direct effects on electric-power generation (EPG) 
through availability (supply), reliability, and prices of imported energy inputs, especially oil and 
coal. On the other hand, EPG is also affected by macroeconomic policies and the regulatory 
framework. In turn, power generation and distribution directly and indirectly affect households. 
These effects and transmission mechanisms can be analyzed within the diagrammatic framework 
described in Fig. 1.
Macroeconomic policies responding to external shocks impinge on EPG via the effects on 
the exchange rate, level, and structure of the tariff system, interest rate, level and allocation of 
public revenues, and other variables. These have major implications on the cost of fuel and other 
inputs to the EPG sector. Changes in the tariff structure and level of duties on the energy sector 
have direct implications on the cost of power and industrial-protection system. For instance, a 
flexible exchange-rate policy, a tight monetary policy, and a low budget-deficit policy -  the 
standard components of an economic stabilization program -  could adversely affect the price of 
imports, access to domestic credit, and government equity advances or subsidies, particularly to 
public utilities. In the latter case, public-sector entities or projects would compete among 
themselves for government funding, especially if there are no compensatory revenue-generating 
initiatives, such as new taxes, improved tax collections, and higher corporate cash generation.
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Government will give priority to public-sector projects with the highest economic and social 
return and implemented by public entities with the best track record of corporate management 
and project implementation. The availability and accessibility of public goods and services to 
households, therefore, are influenced by the allocation of the national budget by agency, 
location, and typ$ of goods and services generated.
E. EPG and Regulations
EPG is further affected by laws, administrative controls, promotion policies, and other 
related factors which, for the most part, regulate the following: (a) entry of new firms; (b) capital 
requirements; (c) promotional and faeilitative policies, i.e., access to cheap credit and lower tariff 
duties on energy inputs; (d) public safety and health; and (e) technical and environmental 
requirements.
National laws often limit foreign ownership in strategic industries, such as those involving 
natural resources and national security, like public utilities. Some laws limit private-property 
rights, commercial transactions, and other forms of relationships involving individuals and 
institutions. The 1987 Constitution limits foreign-ownership participation in natural-resource 
exploration, development, and utilization activities to Filipino citizens, or corporations or 
associations whose capital is 60-percent Filipino-owned. Moreover, the modalities for such 
participation are limited to coproduction, joint venture, or production sharing for a maximum of 
50 years.
In the case of domestic energy exploration and development, which is a critical upstream 
activity for EPG, the initial capital requirements are substantial as are the risks involved. The 
investment risks would normally include noncommercial discoveries, long recoupment period, 
unstable national policies affecting cost recovery and financial return, host community and other 
sources of resistance, and unfavorable market conditions. The “ reservoir risks” are those arising 
from the unsustainability of energy-source supplies due to environmental decay and poor 
extraction methods. Investment and reservoir risks can be minimized by such schemes as the 
extension of fiscal incentives and long-term supply contracts among governments (through 
taxpayers), energy developers, and users based on alternative sharing arrangements with respect 
to risks, costs, and income. Such undertakings as build-and-operate plans may carry take-or-pay 
provisions that encourage a stable production of electric power. Other investment-guarantee 
schemes, such as Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agreement (MIGA) and Overseas Private 
Insurance Corporation (OPIC), also encourage risk-taking by private investors if the host 
government accedes to them.
F. Backward Linkages o f EPG on Energy Source Development
The nature of some indigenous energy sources has major economic and social implications 
especially on communities, households, occupational groups, and labor skills affected. Hydro, 
geothermal, and dendro sources of energy are usually located in natural habitats where upland 
dwellers, cultural communities, and other socioeconomic groups depend on natural resources 
for their livelihood and sustenance. Hence, the manner in which the land-based habitat is 
affected -  by deforestation and soil erosion, for example -- and the extent of the occupants’ 
involvement in its protection and development through watershed protection, reforestation, and
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food production will directly affect their labor-participation rate, economic, health, and other 
social conditions.
In the case of coal-fired and other thermal plants, which are often located near water systems, 
fish sanctuaries will likely be disturbed by changes in water temperature and quality. Airborne 
sulphur and ash emissions from coal-fired plants are a potential health hazard. In this case either 
policy action, such as giving, low priority for coal or a technological option, i.eM washing and 
advanced beneficiation of natural resources offer some solution. All these cases have obvious 
economic implications for those extracting natural resources and for local communities.
In some cases, communities living in energy-development project sites must be physically 
resettled. Based on World Bank experience (Cemea 1990), construction projects designed 
without any provision for resettlement have sometimes led to economically unjustified 
relocation. The Bank now requires that the costs of resetdement (both compensation for lost 
assets and cost of redevelopment measures) be included in the overall project costs and in the 
rate-of-retum calculation. Social-science studies indicate a key link between civil-engineering 
solutions and social engineering of project design and implementation. For instance, there are 
significant trade-offs between dam height and power-generation benefits, and scale of population 
displacement
Resistance can be minimized if the central government shares royalty payments of 
energy-source developers with local governments and communities in the form of a 
host-community fee. The manner in which affected communities react and use external 
resources for coping is critical.
Where resettlement is unavoidable, the host population should be consulted. Ethnic 
antagonism can make some sites undesirable, while the presence of trading or cultural networks 
can make some sites advantageous. Extra investment for basic services are necessary to prevent 
impoverishment and the environmental consequences of induced overpopulation.
G. Other Regulatory Factors
Energy-source development, EPG, and distribution of electricity involve public safety, 
environmental integrity, and interconnection of facilities. Various regulatory institutions p73 
are involved and clearances, such as locational and environmental clearances, required before 
and during project implementation. The clearances have implications on the quality of service 
and return on investments through the cost of design, technical compatibility of projects, and 
revenue-sharing arrangements with operating systems. On the other hand, it is possible that low 
government or private-sector funding will unwittingly encourage certain cost-cutting measures, 
negatively affecting the quality and reliability of service. The ability of regulatory agencies to 
assess the technical, environmental, economic, and social costs as well as benefits of proposed 
projects will be critical in the early acquisition of operating permits and effective monitoring of 
performance, particularly where new technologies — geothermal, solar and nuclear-sourced 
power generation systems — are involved.
EPG is normally pursued through public monopolies, as in Thailand. The conceptual and 
practical basis for encouraging more power generators is a function of the economies of scale
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within both the power system as a whole and its individual components, price of electricity, and 
the quality of service provided by the monopoly or existing generators. Tn the Philippines, EO 
215 encourages cogeneration of electric power by the private sector with the NPC considering 
the latter’s avoided costs, whkh may involve build-operate-and-own (BOO) and BT schemes 
These determinants, in turn, are influenced by macroeconomic policies and the regulatory 
framework as well as by the quality pf corporate and project management. .
Public opinion or perception of the efficiency Of services delivery is a key factor in the 
success of government policy. National security considerations may likewise favor a more open 
and competitive system to avoid dependence on a monopoly or a few utilities. Antitrust and 
similar laws may further discourage the same owners or*overlapping ownership of various stages 
of energy- '^ source development.
The performance of electric power utilities is usually measured using financial, technical, 
and service coverage indicators. Technical indicators include reliability and efficiency of 
utilities. Hence, there is a wide range of public-utility policies which affect (a) distributive equity 
or impact on various income groups and occupational groups among different and within the 
same inconie classes; (b) economic efficiency; (c) the utility’s need to finance expansion and 
quality improvement; and (d) other macroeconomic objectives such as effects on inflation and 
regional development The structure and level of prices « f energy inputs and costs of generated 
outputs have far-reaching allocative-efficiency and social-equity effects.
H. Electric Power Distribution (EPD)
The main, issues of electric power distribution (EPD) — unlike those of energy-source 
development and EPG -  are institutional arrangements for service coverage, mode of 
distributipn and pricing, and, especially in the Philippines, the availability and reliability of 
power supply. EPD is normally distributed either by public or private utilities in service areas 
defined by their respective franchises and operating permits. The right to operate can be acquired 
either through a franchise provided by specific legislation or a certificate of public convenience 
and necessity (CPCN) issued by a regulatory agency of both. Final users, whether industries or 
households, connect through these distributors. On the other hand, direct connection of major 
industrial or institutional users-to the PG utility is technically feasible and may be more efficient 
at a certain voltage level and load-factor, minimizing costly transmission losses arising from 
multiple-distribution stages. Direct connection of consumers to the EPG utility, however, may 
prevent small-size distributors of electricity from attaining certain levels of technical efficiency 
and financial viability due to a decreased load.
Households are directly affected by energy-source development, electric-power generation, 
and electric-power distribution through the following: (a) the nature, source, and relative prices 
of fuel households use; (b) demand of industries for labor which households supply; (c) 
availability and prices of, goods and services which industries produce; and (d) availability of 
public goods and Services. The impact on households is further conditioned by their observed 
response to electric-power rate increases as measured by elasticities qf demand relative to price 
and income and cross elasticity of fuel substitutes, such as electricity anid, fuel wood.
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The income elasticity of household energy demand is generally less than unity. It is higher 
for low-income groups and therefore has a significant distributive effect. This often leads to 
differential pricing of various energy products in favor of fuel products and electricity used 
mainly by poor households (kerosene and subsidized electricity) and by industries (bunker fuel 
and diesel oil).
In 1974, MERALCO introduced a price subsidy for the first 200 MWH as a form of 
socialized pricing, reducing it to the first 50 MWH in 1990. Philippine industries have suffered 
as a result and lost their international competitiveness. Hie same subsidy induced consumers to 
maximize the use of electricity. But since electricity has strong linkages with the rest of the 
economy, having a mean elasticity with respect to the gross domestic product of 0.457 (Alejo 
1983), the use of electricity pricing as a means of redistributing income could compromise 
economic growth (Francisco 1987).
The demand of industries for labor depends on the direct and indirect effects of energy-price 
changes on such industries. The effects, in turn, depend on the energy intensity of industries), 
interfuel substitution and substitutability between energy and other factors of production. The 
long-run substitution effects are higher than the short-run. Based on OECD studies (Kumar and 
Munasinghe 1987), the elasticity of substitution between labor and energy ranged widely from
0.6 to 2.2 depending on the degree of aggregation, estimation period, and estimation procedure. 
The values of cross-price elasticities of interfuel substitution are generally lower at the 
household than the industry level due to the high capital costs of shifting arising from changing 
relative prices. Besides, the savings derived from energy substitution must be weighed carefully 
against the output and employment effects not only on the entire but also specific stages of 
industrial operation. In rice processing, for instance, mechanization arising from the availability 
of electric power has different effects on output and employment, particularly in threshing and 
milling. Over-reliance on manipulating prices in favor of such targeted sectors as farmers or 
rural communities can also have unintended negative effects since better-off households in these 
occupational groups and communities stand to benefit
Alejo’s study, which simulated the effects of an increase in tariff rate on crude petroleum for 
1973-79 shows that employment marginally increased in the long run despite the negative short- 
run effect, presumably manifesting the effect of substitution of labor for energy and despite a 
decline of gross domestic product. Francisco, noting the positive correlation between temperature 
and the demand for electricity, argues the use of time-off day or seasonal pricing to reflect the 
scarcity value of electricity. He speculates that lower electricity bills at night may offset 
overtime and night premium payments and more labor might be employed given a fixed stock of 
capital and equipment in the economy.
The recent phenomenon of power outages as long as 12 hours a day has short- and long-run 
implications on industries, other institutions, and households.
First, the introduction of gas-turbine and other oil-based generating plants which have 
shorter installation periods will mean higher generating costs and electricity prices. Instead of 
being used as reserves or to meet peak loads, they contribute to the base power load. Some 
hydro-based electric-generating plants, such as Caliraya, which use pumped water during
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off-peak periods may be uneconomic when using oiLbased power. The cost of pumping water 
into a higher-elevation reservoir may outweigh the benefits of hydro-generated electricity.
Second, power supply can be rationed in several ways: shifting mobile generating plants i.eM 
bringing electric power barges to power-short areas; rotating pqwer interruption on an 
announced schedule; implementing voluntary load-curtailment programs (VLCP) among heavy 
users; and introducing penalty rates during peak periods. VLCP schemes require discipline. 
Time-based pricing demands special electric meters and would be politically difficult to cany 
out in times of power shortage. Users who can not afford electricity back-up systems may cope 
by rescheduling work hours.
Third, users, including households, are resorting to buying electric generators. Large 
industries have a potential advantage relative to smaller ones. Although overall industrial 
competitive advantage suffers, smaller industries, which are usually labor intensive, may have 
less room to adjust, either in sourcing alternative power or rescheduling operations; power 
outages thus work against employment generation.
Fourth, those who can not adequately respond to the lack of electricity and its attendant 
problems are suffering losses: cancellation of export orders; poor product quality; and payment 
for overtime work.
Those who lose their jobs will have to rely on the usual safety nets -  social security and 
advance leave payments. Increased economic activity arising from the production, processing, 
and sale of alternative fuels such as LPG is one of the few positive results of the power outages. 
The discovery of natural gas in the Philippines is a timely and positive development
I. EPD and Public Goods and Services
The availability of public goods and services is affected by EPG and other aspects of energy 
development through their macroeconomic effects, such as inflation and employment Thus, 
energy pricing should consider its effects on government fiscal operations so that unsustainable 
deficits do not develop due to fiscal subsidies to EPG.
The key factors affecting the price of goods and services by EPG are industrial capacity to 
cut power costs, pricing policy, maiket structure, and elasticity of demand of households for 
various industrial goods and services. The extent to which industries pass on the rate changes to 
households depends on their pricing policies — whether at full cost or through marginal pricing 
-- and their prominence given the market structure. The extent to which these factors affect 
household welfare is further influenced by the individual household’s maximizing behavior on 
the consumption of goods and services, such as food and education, through the provision of 
labor services and income from government4
J. Institutional Factors
Institutional arrangements play a major role in managing the EPG sector and its component 
programs and raising their social and private benefits. Many households directly tap other
4. See Lamberte et at (1991) for a more elaborate treatment of the macro effects of public policies-on households.
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sources of energy such as wood and can be mobilized to promote sustainable practices 
especially in communal properties and thus prevent irreversible resource depletion. The legal 
framework of private-property rights, particularly the right of access to communal and public 
properties, also critically determines the household’s ability to improve its welfare. The system 
of property rights should define who may use the resource, and the duration, extent, and 
conditions of use consistent with the generation of returns from sustainable use (de los Angeles 
1990).
Furthermore, various ownership and management structures of firms have similar social 
implications. These structures include the standard corporate model, such as private-utility 
operations, where decisions are controlled by the major stockholders, and the cooperative 
model, where all members exercise equal voting rights, such as RECS. Depending on the model 
and sources of equity, groups or individuals will exert varying efforts and influence and derive 
benefits accordingly.
Within a broader institutional context, the regulatory structure should be as simple and 
unified as possible. This will result in a single set of policy directions, avoid policy 
inconsistencies common in multiple and overlapping regulatory jurisdictions, and facilitate 
implementation decisions regarding, for instance, securing a license and submitting performance- 
monitoring reports. A progressive personnel career development and training program to build 
capability to match new technologies will stabilize regulatory institutions or arrangements; In a 
pluralistic society, a system of regionally dispersed energy generation and distribution units with 
broad- based ownership is favored. But it will have to be reconciled with such factors as the 
sustainability of the cooperative model (where volunteerism and government assistance in the 
form of subsidies and training are key inputs), scale economies, local demand, and other 
considerations.
V. REGULATION OF THE POWER GENERATION 
AND DISTRIBUTION IN THE PHILIPPINES
A. Institutional Arrangements
The Aquino government changed the institutional structure of the energy secton Its most 
drastic move was the abolition of the Ministry of Energy. At present, the key public institutions 
are the Energy Coordinating Council (ECC), Office of Energy Affairs (OEA), National Power 
Corporation (NPC), Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC), National Electrification 
Administration (NEA), Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), and the Environmental Management 
Bureau (EMB).
The ECC was created in September 1988 by EO 338 to strengthen and institutionalize the 
coordination among the different institutions in the energy sector, particularly those formulating 
policies, plans, and programs. The Council is chaired by the Presidential Adviser on Energy 
Affairs; its members are the OEA executive director, NPC and PNOC presidents, and NEA 
administrator. The OEA serves as the technical secretariat to the ECC.
The OEA was created by Executive Order No. 193 and is responsible for the formulation, 
planning, monitoring, implementation, and coordination of policies and programs in the field of 
energy. Its basic function is to ensure a continuous, adequate, and economic supply of energy
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and ultimately achieve energy self-reliance through intensive exploration and development of 
indigenous energy resources, and through the judicious^conservation and efficient use of energy. 
The OEA, thereforcy must coordinate extensively with PNOC, NPC,NEA, ERB, and EMB in 
formulating sector policies.
The ERB is, a quasijudicial body established in N^ay 1988. It is responsible fpr setting and 
regulating the prices of petrpleum products. The ERB also regulates capacity expansion of 
refineries, rates of private electric utilities, except NPC and electric cooperatives, and their 
operation. The Board may also regulate the importing, exporting, shipping, transporting, 
processing, refining, marketing, and distribution of all energy resources. The Board is composed 
of a chair and three commissioners who are all Presidential appointees; The Board’s decisions 
are binding and implemented immediately, appealable only to the Supreme Court
Except for a few private utilities, the NPC was the sole generator of electric power until 
September 1989 when EO 215 allowed private-sector participation in power generation. Created 
under RA 6395 in September 1971, the NPC’s primary responsibility is to develop the country’s 
power grids and generating capability. NPC facilities are organized into three, separate p73 
systems: Luzon, Mindanao, and the Visayas. While Luzon and Mindanao have their own grids, 
the Visayas system includes four .relatively independent grids: Cebu, Negros and Panay, Leyte, 
apd Bohol. , ,
NPC is allowed to realize & maximum rate of 10 percent annually based on its rate base of 
net operating assets plus two months of working capital. The rates of NPC are fixed by its Board 
and were subject to review by the defunct Public Service Commission and now by ERB. NPC 
rates, however, are highly influenced by the ECC and Office of the President and may be 
reviewed by ERB if complaints are filed and request for hearing is obtained.
An adequate, reasonably priced, reliable electricity supply, and nationwide electrification by 
developing power-generation plants using indigenous energy sources remain'critical components 
of current national policies. As the sole government agency engaged principally in the 
generation, transmission, distribution, and wholesale of electric power, the NPC enjoys some 
tax and duty exemptions. It is also exempt from the Central Bank peso-block-account 
requirement for its commercial arid Paris Club loans under the second round o f restructuring 
agreement It draws equity contribution from the liational government, its sole owiier, and has 
access to ODA, which effectively lowers its capital and operating expenses. At the end of 1990, 
its authorized capital was P50 billion, paid-in capital P16 billion, and actual capital P36billion. 
It received P9.55 billion additional equity in 1980-90.
The NPC avails of program and project loans from multilateral financing institutions such as 
World Bank and Asian Development Bank to ensure the availability of foreign-exchange 
funding for projects and specific investment activities. However, these institutions require NPC 
to generate a minimum of 8-percent rate of return on . rate base (RORB) through their loan 
covenants.
PNOC is the main institutional arm of the government in energy-resource development and 
the petroleum industry. It was established in November 1973 by PD No. 334, the .result of the 
buy-out of ESSO Philippines, Inc. a subsidiary of ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc. and Bataan
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Refining Corporation, the biggest crude-oil refinery in the country. Through PD 334, the PNOC 
has built up government capability in the major areas of oil trade, refining and manufacturing, 
marketing, shipping, transport, and storage, as well as in exploration and development of 
geothermal an coal resources. At present, PNOC competes with two foreign oil-refining and 
marketing companies (Shell and Caltex), the foreign Philippine Geothermal Inc. (PGI), and a 
number of domestic coal-mining companies. Petrophil, PNOC’s marketing subsidiary, is the 
country* leading oil-marketing firm. In times of petroleum-supply crises, it has been able to 
stabilize local supplies of petroleum by entering into direct govemment-to- government supply 
agreement with oil-producing countries.
The NEA was created by RA 6038, as amended by PDs 269 and 1645, to provide 
nationwide electrification by providing technical and financial support for rural electric 
cooperatives (RECs). NEA has helped establish about 140 RECs; 119 are operating, serving 
1,301 towns and cities, 21,314 barangays, and more than 3 million households, or 52 percent of 
the population. By the end of 1991, about 65 percent of the population had access to electricity. 
The original 1972 target was total electrification by year 2000. However, the NEA’s 
effectiveness has been undermined by several factors, one of which was NEA’s involvement in 
activities unrelated to electrification, such as the establishment of livelihood projects in rural 
areas and a number of unsuccessful experiments in renewable-energy sources, such as 
dendrothermal projects. In addition, low load, poor maintenance, political patronage, and 
management inefficiency pushed many financially stricken RECs to the brink of insolvency. 
The sale to the private sector of RECs is now a public policy. In 1986-90, NEA ^vailed of 
government subsidy amounting to P480 million.
In 1987, EMB succeeded the National Environmental Protection Council (NEPC), the 
National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC), and the Environment Center of the Philippines 
(ECP). The EMB is mandated to do the following: (a) recommend policies and progress for 
environmental-management pollution control, including statutory requirements; (b) formulate 
quality standards for water, air, land, and noise; (c) formulate rules and regulations for the 
disposal of wastes and toxic substances; (d) guide its regional offices in implementing policies 
and programs, standards, and projects; and (e) liaise with the legislative, public, and other 
government agencies involved in environmental matters. EMB is a bureau under the Department 
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and undertakes ecological studies, p73 
conducts EIA, and issues and enforces ECCs. The enforcement of antipollution laws is pursued 
further by the Pollution Adjudication Board, an attached agency of the DENR.
The failures of environmental-protection activities in the past prompted the following 
natural-resources and environmental- quality management steps.
1) Adoption and implementation of the Philippine Strategy for Sustainable 
Development (PSSD) according to Cabinet Resolution No. 37, 29 November 
1989. PSSD aims to achieve and maintain economic growth without depleting 
natural resources or degrading environmental quality.
2) Enactment by Congress of the Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear 
Waste Control Act (RA No. 6969).
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3) Strengthening of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) system PD 1586 
institutionalized the EIA system to forecast the impacts of critical development 
projection the environmentand to determine preventive or nrittgating measures.
4) Establishment of standards for air and water quality and prescribed guidelines for 
land-use management, natural-resources management, aiid conservation, 
utilization of surface and ground waters, and waste management consistent with 
PD 1132.
RECs are non*stock and non-profit, registered under RA 6038, as amended by PDs 269 and 
1645 or organized under the Philippine Nan-Agricultural Cooperative Act whether converted 
under PD 260 or not RECs may generate, manufacture, purchase, acquire, accumulate, and 
transmit electric power and energy, and distribute, sell, supply, and dispose of electric energy for 
the mutual benefits of its members and patrons and of other entities requiring its services. RECs 
are generally exempt from paying taxes, duties and, to a certain extent fees that may be required 
for their operations. In addition, RECs are normally given preference in the sale of NPC electric 
power. Direct connection of large customers to NPC is covered by an NPC-Board of Investment 
agreement and subject to rules and conditions of the ERB. (See Annex A on ERB Resolution 
91-22).
B. The Regulatory and Promotional Environment
Energy-power generation and distribution (EPGD), including energy-source development 
are the subject of a number of laws, policies, administrative rules, and regulations governing the 
following: (a) entry and ownership in the various components of the electric-power sector, from 
energy-source development to ^lectricity distribution; (b) access to inputs and financial and 
fiscal treatment of power utilities; (c) input pricing and costs; (d) electricity pricing; (e) public 
safety; (f) exit; and (g) other regulations. Other regulations include compliance requirements 
with technical standards using efficiency and reliability-of-service indicators, such as 
transmission and distribution-system losses and other government directives, like lifetime 
tariffs.
Entry and Ownership.5 Article XH (National Economy and Patrimony) of the 1987 
Constitution provides that the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources 
Shall be (a) under state supervision, (b) through co-production, joint venture or 
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60 percent 
Filipino-owned for 25 years at most and renewable for not more than 25 years, and (c) through 
technical or financial assistance in the case of foreign-owned corporations. The provision is 
implemented by the Foreign Investment Act of 1991 (RA 7042) through the Foreign Investment 
Negative List A (where foreign ownership is limited by the Constitution and specific laws) and 
PD 8, as amended by PD 1857 which introduced the service contract approach in oil exploration 
and development (in lieu of the concession system under RA 387).
5. Structural barrier* to entry are not covered. These include scale economies and excess capacity, absolute advantages, high 
capital requirements, and imperfect capital markets and predatory pricing (SG V Consulting 1992).
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The OEA oversees the granting and implementation of service contract a^eements, a 
function of the former Ministry of Energy. The OEA also planned and formulated the 1986-90 
Power Development Program. Service contracts and similar schemes avoid the constitutional 
limit on foieign-equity participation on energy-resource development and provide greater 
flexibility in risks and profit-sharing between government and private investors.
Significantly, RA 7042 and its implementing rules and regulations (a) remove the 
preapproval requirement of the Board of Investments under Book II of EO 226 or the Omnibus 
Investment Act for enterprises not seeking BOI incentives, prior to registration with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), (b) reduce other registration requirements and 
simplify the process, (c) reduce the reporting requirements, and (d) time- bounds [puts a limit on 
the period for action] processing of applications and clearances.
In the case of EPGD utilities, entry and operation conditions are generally governed by the 
Public Service law (CA 146, as amended) which the ERB administers for electric light and 
power plants or private electric and power utilities which fall under the category of industrial 
public services. In addition, die NEA and its Board acting as the National Electrification 
Commission grants authority for the operation of RECs.
The institutional model for EPGD has major implications for the financial viability of 
operating units. In particular, the one-member-one-vote, nonprofit principle underlying the 
cooperative model is potentially inconsistent with efficient management and reinvestment 
objectives. These operating objectives are critical to the attainment of a wider coverage of rural 
electrification unless massive government subsidy is provided.
The equipment, generating and producing units, type and quality of services to be rendered 
and, in general, the manner of operation of private utilities and RECs, must conform with their 
certificates of public convenience and necessity, the Philippine Electrical Safety Code, and 
international electrical- and mechanical-engineering standards. These requirements would 
normally include (a) standard nominal voltage and metering, (b) schedule of rates, i.e., basic 
rates and other allowable adjustments covering power cost and currency-exchange rate where 
foreign loans are involved, and (c) logbook of operations.
Under Section II of Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution, the issuance of a franchise, 
certificate, or other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall (a) be limited 
to Filipino citizens or corporations, and b) neither be exclusive in character nor for a period 
longer than 50 years. It shall further be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress 
when the common good so requires. Equity participation in public utilities is to be encouraged. 
The Constitutional provision may not, however, be an absolute bar to entry. The Supreme Court 
ruled in a decision dated 11 July 1989 (Albano vs, Reyes 175 SCRA 264) that “franchises issued 
by Congress are not required before each and every public utility may operate.”  The same 
Constitutional provision does not necessarily imply that only Congress has the right to grant 
such authorization. For instance, the authority to grant franchise to transport operators has been 
given to the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board. This ruling remains the 
subject of debate and is not looked upon with favor by most members of Congress.
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At present, DOTC still requires a Congressional ^franchise of private telecommunication 
carriers who wish to bid for public; contracts to operate telecommunication facilities. Franchise 
holders must pay a  franchise tax in addition to income, and other taxes. The Constitution further 
provides that the participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility 
enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital and that all the executive and 
managing officers of such corporation or association must be Filipino citizens!
RA 6957 (governing BOT and build-and-transfer or BT schemes) permits BOT and BT 
participants to engage in power generation, distribution, electrification, and related functions to 
operate through a utility franchise granted to the lowest bidder.
EO 215 allows the private sector to generate electric power subject to an electricity off-take 
and pricing agreement with the NPC and NBA and other franchise electric utilities based on 
OEA guidelines. It is often argued that NPC should make transparent its computational 
guidelines for estimating its off-take tariff and avoided cost for all types of plants in order to 
facilitate private-sector co-generation and interconnection decisions.
Notwithstanding the demonopolization of power generation, some provisions of the 
guidelines of EO 215 remain restrictive and may need to be; reviewed. For instance, a 
private-sector generation facility (PSGF) is limited to the largest geneiiating- unit size or 10 
percent of the coincident demand of the NPC grid. Likewise, PSGF providing block-power 
production facilities can hot supply directly to electric distributors without interconnecting with 
NPC. This Condition preserves NPC’s role as the strategic planner for the grid. Thus, the private 
sector is limited to providing supplementary reserve power or peaking power supply instead of 
being encouraged to provide viable alternative base power plants to NPC grids. In this 
connection, the proposed 700-MW Pagbilao coal thermal plant to be put up by the private 
sector, which will add to NPC’s base capacity, is a positive development Significantly, NPC is 
now encouraging lease-and-operate agreements with the private sector in some of its existing 
plants, such as MIESCOR’s rehabilitation and operation of the Ambuklao plant. EO 215 
discourages and RA 6957 prohibits a national-govemment guarantee of foreign financing of 
infrastructure facilities. These regulations reduce the flexibility of potential BOT operators to a 
few models of financial cooperation among usual participants, i.e., project proponents, banks, 
suppliers and the national government or LGU considering that, a government financing 
guarantee is normally a part of the risk sharing arrangement underlying the BOT model.
OEA must more actively promote co-generation with interconnection instead of being a 
passive arbiter and monitor. RA 7156 or the Mini-Hydroelectric Power Development Law 
further encourages the private .sector to participate in power generation and help ease power 
shortages.
NEA’s performance used to be heavily biased toward expanded area coverage of rural 
electricity.6 Efficiency in operations is increasingly being given a higher priority. Moreover, the 
selective take-over of RECs under the privatization program is being pursued consistently with 
the policy of allowing private-sector lease of some NPC plants. NEA must, however, reconcile its
6. Private electric utilities are addressed here. They ate subject to the ERB regulatory framework; and are less problematic than 
RECs.
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promotional and lending roles with its regulatory role. For instance, the occasional designation 
of NEA personnel as cooperative managers in problem cooperatives tends to discourage 
entrepreneurial development in the long-run and generates a conflict of interest NEA must be 
more than a receiver.
Access to Inputs. The ability of EPGD operators to provide viable services is influenced by 
the policy and regulatory regime — unhindered access to energy sources, imported equipment, 
and finance, for instance -- affecting their inputs.
There are few administrative restrictions to such inputs. NPC and RECs, for example, often 
enjoy tax exemptions and subsidies under existing laws subject to the endorsement of the Fiscal 
Incentives Review Board and availability of appropriations through the Tax Expenditure Fund in 
case budgetary subsidies are required.
The importation of coal is subject to ERB clearance to encourage the use of indigenous 
sources. ERB also regulates the importation of refined petroleum products to encourage local 
refinery utilization. The importation of electric generator sets by nonutilities is occasionally 
liberalized through tariff and tax exemptions to address recurring power shortages. Importation 
of products covered by the Progressive Export Program for Consumer Electronic Products will 
be liberalized once tariff adjustments are introduced.
On 9 October 1991, NEDA approved guidelines for private- sector access to ODA (with 
sharing of concessionality) through conduit government institutions to avoid restrictions imposed 
by the Foreign Borrowings Act (RA 245). The guidelines give preference to electric generation 
and distribution and five other sectors subject to their high priority rating as supportive of the 
Development Plan, their economic viability, and the consideration that they are economically 
viable but not financially feasible. For instance, the ASEAN-Japan Development Fund provides 
long-term credit through the DBP and conduit private banks. The energy sector also benefits 
from some limited government-wide research on energy development, such as renewable 
resources and conservation. At present NEA provides concessional financing to RECs at about 
12-percent interest with 15 to 20 years to pay (with a reasonable grace period) and allows 
restructuring of RECs’ loans on a case by case basis.
Under the provisions of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (EO 226), preferred areas 
of economic activities listed in the Investment Priorities Plan (IPP) are entitled to some 
incentives. The 1991 IPP included power generation and distribution under the following 
qualifications.
1) Power generation: tip to 100-percent foreign ownership if the project is classified 
as pioneer, i.e., uses nonconventional fuels or source of energy such as 
geothermal, solar, wind power, biomass, etc., or technology not commercially 
tried in the Philippines. A plant should have a generating capacity of at least 50 
MW to be connected to the NPC grid system. The 50-MW cut-off should be 
reviewed for technical and economic efficiency considerations and consistency 
with EO 215, particularly with respect to the largest allowable generating unit for 
interconnection with NPC. A former Secretary of Energy, Geronimo Velasco, 
reportedly contended that electricity from self-generated power sources is cheaper
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than what can be purchased directly from MERALCO because of the latter pricing 
and cost structure.
2) Electric distribution in less-developed areas: up to 40 percent foreign-owned (as a 
public-utility project).
The incentives for the first project category are as follows: (a) income-tax holiday for three 
years for expansion projects, fojlr years for new but nonpioneer projects, and six years for 
pioneer projects and those located in less-developed areas; (b) tax and duty-free importation of 
capital equipment up to 12 August 1992; (c) tax credit on domestically fabricated capital 
equipment up to 12 August 1992; and (d) employment of foreign nationals. The second type of 
project is entitled to the same incentives except the income-tax holiday. Incentives are being 
considered for extension under the proposed 1992 IPP.
Input Pricing aujri Costs. The pricing of energy inputs and electricity is governed 
principally by the following: (a) provisions of the service contract (in the case of foreign-owned 
corporations) affecting energy-source development (e.g., geothermal steam); BOT contract as 
authorized under the BOT law (RA 6957) and Private Sector Generation Facility agreements 
under EO 215;, (c) pricing policy on petroleum products, which generally favors diesel oil and 
kerosene -- used most often by industries and low-income households, respectively; (d) tax and 
other nontax privileges of energy users (e.g., NPC end RECs); (c) other laws (e.g., Local 
Government Code);' and (f) electricity-pricing policy as practiced by NPC and regulated by the 
ERB and the National Electrification Commission (NEC).
PD 8, as amended, is perceived as unfavorable to private service contractors due to the 
mandated government share and the exploration and “ reservoir”  risks involved. This handicap 
is, however, largely addressed by the BOT law. For instance, the BOT contract of NPC with 
Hopewell (operation of a gas turbine plant at Navotas) guarantees the private contractor a fixed 
monthly “ energy fee”  and an additional energy fee based on the actual amount of energy 
generated in exchange for Hopewell, guaranteeing a reliable power supply of 200 MW and at a 
power price lower than NPC’s “ avoided cost,”  which is what the cost to NPC would be if it 
were to build and operate the power plant using its own resources.
As regards the prices of petroleum products used as EPG inputs* Such as bunker and diesel 
oil, the existing policy puts the burden of oil-price increments on less-essential fuel products, 
like gasoline. This policy, including the special fiscal and financial accommodations granted to 
NPC and NEA, has implications for electricity pricing, cost recovery, and investment programs 
of EPGD utilities. It is a key instrument of the policy on national incomes and price.
The Local Government Code (LGQ of 1991 has several provisions affecting the operations 
and viability of the EPGD sector:
1) Sec. 289 Chapter 2: local government units (LGUs) shall have a share of 40 
percent of the gross collection derived by the national government from the 
preceding fiscal year from the utilization and development pf the national wealth,
e.g., royalties and share arising from coproduction, joint venture, and production 
sharing agreements, on top of their intemal-revenue allocations;
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2) Sec. 291 Chapter 2: LGUs shall have a share based on the preceding fiscal year 
from the proceeds derived by any government agency or corporation engaged in 
the utilization of the national wealth based on 1 percent of the gross receipts of 
the preceding calendar year or 40 percent of all taxes, royalties and other fees 
they would have paid if not otherwise exempt, whichever is higher,
3) Sec. 294 Chapter 2: the prcceeds of the share of LGUs shall finance local 
development and livelihood projects, provided that 80 percent of thp proceeds 
derived from the development and utilization of hydrothermal, geothermal, and 
other sources of energy shall be applied solely to cover the cost of electricity in 
the LGU where such source of energy is located;
4) Sec. 26 Chapter 3: it shall be the duty of every national government agency or 
corporation authorizing or involved in the planning and implementation of any 
project to consult LGUs, NGOs, and other sectors to explain the goals of the 
project, its environmental and ecological impact, and to take measures to prevent 
or minimize the adverse effects; and
5) Sec. 193 Chapter 5: unless otherwise provided under the Code, tax exemption or 
incentives enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including 
government-owned or controlled corporations, except local water districts, 
cooperatives duly registered under RA 6938, nonstock and nonprofit hospitals 
and educational contributions, are hereby withdrawn. This particular provision 
needs clarification since it may conflict with more specific laws providing unique 
incentives to EPGD operators.
In addition, the LGC, under Book II Title One confers power to LGUs to create other 
sources of income subject to some common limitations. This means that they cannot impose 
income tax, except when levied on banks and other financial institutions.
Given these LGC provisions, it is expected that LGUs and affected communities will 
become more receptive to the hosting of EPGD projects due to their sharing of royalties and 
other incomes if the utilization of national wealth is involved and their participation in the 
pre-implementation consultations and planning.
The scope of specific taxing power of provinces, particularly those which may affect the 
EPD sector include the following:
1) a tax on business enjoying a franchise, at a rate not exceeding half of 1 percent of 
the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar year within its territorial 
jurisdiction; and
2) a tax on transfer of real property ownership at half of 1 percent of the total 
consideration involved or the fair market value, whichever is higher.
Electricity Pricing. Section 1 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the 
equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth. Moreover, Section 7 of Article X 
entitles LGUs to an equitable share in the process of the utilization and development of the
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national wealth within their respective areas* including further sharing with the inhabitants by 
way of direct benefits.
At present, the pricing of electric power by NPC is different for each grid and essentially 
reflects grid-generating costs. The NPC charter further provides that a uniform schedule p73 of 
rates shall apply to all customers that fall within the same classification in an interconnected 
system. Moreover, these costs are passed on to distributors such as the RECs and private electric 
utilities and large cpstojpners directly connected to NPC, based on an existing agreement with the 
BOI and the rules and guidelines of ERB.
Thus* large industrial loads should be connected with electric distributors if' the latter meet 
certain technical and financial standards. The ERB Resolution 91-22 financial: standards are as 
follows: (a) there is no outstanding debt.with NPC; (b) the debt-service ratio is not below 1.25 
(ie., for every peso,of debt, the pet income of the utility before interest is P1.25 or higher); (c) 
the operating-expense ratio is 95 percent or less; and (d) the average collection period is 45 days 
or less. Systems losses should not exceed 14 percent initially, and later 10 percent in five years. 
The transition period to meet these ERB requirements, is one year. The NEC is expected to or 
must now prescribe similar standards to be applicable to RECs.
The differential-pricing approach underlying the multigrid system penalizes poor 
households in less developed regions that do not have cheap power sources. The only way for 
them to enjoy comparatively cheap power is through cross-subsidy from other users in the same 
grid or from the government
With the LGC’s implementation in 1992, the share of LGUs pursuant to Section 7, Article X 
of the 1987 Constitution can be provided through at least two modalities. First, a uniform 
nationwide power tariff may be considered with the share of beneficiary LGUs in the national 
wealth being used by affected communities to subsidize members, consistent with Section 294 
chapter 2 of the LGC. This will require either a revision of the charter of the NPC regarding the 
multigrid system or the technical interconnection of all grids. The second is to maintain the 
electricity-differential grid-pricing approach with local communities enjoying cheap energy 
sources which reflects their share of the utilization of the national wealth, i.e., hydro and 
geothermal sources in their locality. In both options, power rates should reflect the implications 
of providing the share of the national wealth to LGUs, in the form of lower-cost power supply to 
entitled communities. This, however, is not significant since the value of the share of LGUs in 
the national wealth in 1992 is estimated at only about P380 million.
In addition to the existing rules and regulations on electric pricing, the NPC charges PAS AR 
and PHILPHOS in Leyte, where the national government has equity and loan guarantee risks 
P0.977/KwH lower than electric cooperatives (P1.63/KwH) due to a previous Presidential 
directive. RECs operating in the mainland (in contrast to island cooperatives) were also formerly 
subject to a government-directed P2.50/KwH rate ceiling.
Any changes in power rates must also consider the eventual implementation of a 1987 
Cabinet decision to restructure power rates based on long-run marginal cost (LRMC), provide 
lifeline rates to poor communities, and correct distortions between rates in the Visayas and those 
in Luzon and Mindanao. Hie proposed power-rate restructuring, which will be reflected mainly
32
in NPC rates, upholds the wholesaler-retailer concept wherein franchise rights will be protected 
through a rate differential between utilities and nonutilities.
C. Specific Policies and Regulations
NPC was the country’s sole generator of electric power until September 19S9 when EO 215 
allowed the private sector to participate in power generation. Created under RA 6395 in 
September 1971, the NPC’s primary responsibility is to develop the country’s power grids and 
generating capability.
NPC is allowed to realize a maximum rate of 10 percent annually based on revalued net 
fixed assets plus some working capital. NPC rates are highly influenced by the ECC and Office 
of the President; NPC rates may be reviewed by ERB. In practice, NPC targets a minimum 
8-percent rate of return on rate base, a 1.3 gross internal cash generation to debt service ratio 
(debt coverage) and a 20-percent self-financing ratio, i.e., net internal cash generation as a 
proportion of capital expenditures. The first requirement has been temporarily reduced to a 6.5- 
percent RORB instead of 8 percent by official foreign creditors to accommodate NPC’s present 
circumstances.
In 1990, NPC’s financial performance deteriorated resulting in net losses of P65 million and 
a debt-service ratio of 0.9-1.0 and a current ratio below 1.0. While its cash generation was 
positive owing largely to debt rescheduling, 100 percent of its capital expenditures Was financed 
from loans. Its financial problems were due to insufficient tariff adjustments, lower increases in 
power sales, and higher costs arising from higher oil prices, and the devaluation in 1990.
Rural Electric Cooperatives (RECs). Unlike private electric utilities, RECs have access to 
concessional NEA loans and HRB- approved limited tax subsidies. The following cost factors 
are considered in the determination of REC rates: (a) cost of a REC’s generated power or 
purchased power from NPC; (b) operation and maintenance costs; (c) interest and other charges 
on long-term debt; (d) provision for reinvestment; and (e) provision for actual power losses or a 
25-percent allowance, whichever is lower.
RECs are not subject to rate-of-retum criteria as they are supposed to be nonprofit Their 
costs, however, are underrecovered due to many reasons, including the extent that allowable 
schedules of electric rates do not reflect true depreciation costs based on actual replacement 
value of their assets. Like NPC, RECs must absorb power and transmission losses beyond that 
allowed by their approved schedules of rates and performance standards or as agreed with the 
NEC. There are also doubtful accounts receivable to reckon with. In 1985-90, NEA's average 
collection efficiency was 21 percent on current accounts and 16 percent on arrears. Some 
tax-exemption privileges of government-owned or controlled corporations previously authorized 
under EO 93 have been effectively withdrawn, while some, as in the case of cooperatives per 
Memorandum Order No. 65 dated 21 January 1987, took effect on July 1987.
NPC and RECs must contend with often-inadequate national- government appropriations for 
the Tax Expenditures Fund to pay for tax subsidies, as evidenced by the issuance of Certificate 
of Entitlement to Subsidy(ies) by the Fiscal Incentives Review Board. Under the Cooperative 
Code of the Philippines (RA 6938), RECs are given three years from 10 March 1990 to register
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with the Authority to be eligible for tax- and duty-exemption privileges. It is not clear whether 
this privilege has been superseded by the LGC and amends EO 93.
NPC and NEA axe faced with serious financing problems. While NPC remains profitable in 
general, it does not have enough internal resources to implement the. power-development 
program. This situation is due mainly to the nonimplementation of the LRMC pricing policy 
approved by the Cabinet, delays in tariff adjustments and ODA availment as a result of judicial 
appeals, and slow project approvals, respectively, and bureaucratic inefficiencies.
The repayment rate of RECs to NEA; for instance, is only about 72 percent NEA has a huge 
inventory of unutilized and deteriorating assets, such as minihydro and dendrothermal 
equipment some of which were acquired through foreign loans.- A bail-out program was 
approved by the Cabinet on 10 January 1991 to address the problem of cost underrecovery. The 
plan consists of (a) write-off of receivables from remote and nonviable RECs, (b) relief from 
past nonenergy related obligations, and (c) assumption by the national government of all NEAs’ 
foreign loans and conversion of the same into equity as they fall due.
The bail-out program will involve die conversion of NEA foreign loans to 
national-govemment equity and the transfer of NEA’s nonperforming assets to the national 
government
Other Regulations. Other regulations affecting the EPGD sector are the imposition of 
technical standards, labor laws, local ordinances, and other procedures,
Plants must follow environmental laws in the interest of public health and safety. They must 
acquire an environmental compliance certificate from the EMB based on an environmental 
impact assessment and consultations with affected communities. A condition often required by 
EMB is certification that the technology is environmentally acceptable in the source country. 
EMB also requires the setting up of environmental-guarantee funds, as in the case of the 
proposed CALACAII project, to address the social and other costs of environmentally sensitive 
projects. Hie setting up of guarantee funds may require some guidelines in the monetization of 
environmental externalities using any or a combination of the damage-cost, control-cost, and 
willingness-to-pay approaches and based on the “polluter pays”  principle.
Proposed EPGD projects requiring foreign-loan financing, including those funded by NPC 
and NEA, must undergo review and appraisal by the Investment Coordination Committee of the 
NEDA Board. These projects must be financially and economically viable and endorsed by the 
Regional Development Council where the projects are to be located.
VL CONCLUSIONS
The state performs provider, enabler, and regulatory roles regardless of its political ideology. 
The provider role is underpinned by the need to produce public goods and, in many instances, to 
address the needs of the poor. As an enabler, the state promotes private participation in economic 
activities. As regulator, it discourages unacceptable individual and corporate behavior. The 
pursuit of political normalization-cum-economic liberalization as a national strategy demands a
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review of this three-fold role of the state. Moreover, such review ought to address and consider 
both the macro and micro implications of the final decision.
In the Philippines, economic instability adds another dimension to te review of the state’s 
roles. The government has comparatively fewer resources to fund or carry out its traditional 
activities and must pass some of them on to the private sector. Hie state’s regulatory aspect must 
especially undergo review. To encourage privatization, the state should relax market-related 
regulations and concentrate on nonmarket-related regulations that will improve public safety, 
ensure compliance with performance standards on monopolies, and protect the natural 
environment It must avoid using as a reason to intervene any signs of market imperfection 
which, for the most part are likely to be the transition costs of economic adjustment or 
regulations themselves.
The review of regulations must address legal and other government restrictions which 
discourage sound macroeconomic policies and impede their positive transmission to consumers. 
Market-oriented deregulation must be comprehensively pursued across all sectors and 
accompanied by other modes of liberalization, such as decentralization, if private initiatives are 
to be freed and resources allocated efficiently. Only a systematic review and pursuit of 
regulations will allow deregulation to result in efficiency gains.
The trends of the 1980s and 1990s were and are mixed: there are fewer regulations now in 
industry, agriculture, finance, and utilities; on the other hand, there are more regulations 
affecting the natural environment Similarly, legal and administrative requirements on public 
consultations, whether on proposed policies or investment projects, are now imposed and 
dictated by political realities.
To be sure, there remains a wide scope for further reforms and implementation of fewer 
restrictions in many sectors. For instance, the implementation of the LRMC principle in the 
power sector has yet to take place. Legal restrictions on rates of returns, particularly in the 
utilities sector, would require review in the light of the BOT law to encourage greater private 
investments. On the other hand, the removal of barriers to entry *»- demonopolization and less 
government direct ownership -  are the mtfst advanced liberalization measures so far. As greater 
competition is allowed, restrictions on pricing and rates of return common in the utilities sector 
will have to be relaxed, otherwise liberalization efforts will become irrelevant
Households, whether as consumers or providers of labor, have been affected different^ 
depending on where restrictions have been removed. In the case of regulations on public safety 
and the natural environment, trade-offs often exist between immediate investments and jobs and 
safer but costlier projects. Conflict resolution with compensation mechanisms is critical in 
addressing such trade-offs, preferably outside the ambit of the judiciary to avoid unnecessary 
legal complications.
The process of setting up new regulations and dismantling those that have lost their utility 
value is akin to the management of structural-adjustment programs. Speed, sequence, and other 
aspects of the process need special attention and calibrated implementation. At the same time, 
some aspects and effects of externalities would require more analytical work to minimize 
unintended effects.
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Three major issues affect the future role and development of the EPGD sedan entry and 
production; allocation and operation access and equity; and institutional-arrangement issues.
Entry and production issues relate to expanding electric- supply by addressing regulations 
which hamper productive capacity: entry conditions; financial and fiscal incentives; pricing; and 
other related concerns. Entry regulations have been substantially loosened. RA 7042 (Foreign 
Investment law), EO 215 (Power Co-generation law), and RA 6947 (BOT law) offer improved 
entry conditions through the delegated grant of franchises and policy of providing a fair rate of 
return to private investors. Some of the major remaining hindrances are the discouragement of 
financial guarantee by the national government of BOT projects and the mandatory 
interconnection with NPC grids of PSGF. Serious consideration is now being given to the 
private sector take-over of distressed cooperatives. On the other hand, there are fewer fiscal 
incentives available to NPC and RECs unless they avail of the Tax Expenditure Fund and the 
latter register with the Cooperatives Development Authority.
Private utilities, on the other hand, have better access to ODA through relending windows of 
government financial institutions and BOI fiscal incentives under certain Conditions, e.g., if they 
generate at least 50 MW. Pricing, however, remains regulated and a highly political matter. It is 
complicated by poor service by the NPC and RECs and by increased costs from a higher 
oil-based fuel mix thus making rate increases difficult to justify.
Main regulations on allocation and operation have to do with compliance with 
environmental and utility-operating standards. New entrants are faced with a stricter 
environmental-assessment process under The Philippine Environmental Impact Statement 
System (PD 1586) and host-community acceptance requirements such as consultations and 
compensation. Incumbent utility operators also need to comply with financial and technical 
standards of operation as imposed by ERB on private electric utilities and those planned by the 
NEC for application to RECs. Enforcement of said standards has, however, been less rigid due to 
the difficulty faced by most electric distributors, notably RECs. A more reasonable transition 
period and standards of performance are required. Moreover, the financial standards should 
consider utility pricing and other constraints like nonimplementation of the LRMC pricing 
policy and weak market demand due to the economic slowdown.
Access and equity issues must address the conflict between cost recovery and the need to 
assist poor households with subsidized electricity within the context of a more defined policy on 
the role of the supply and pricing of electricity to different regions and end-users. Meralco has 
reduced its electricity subsidy. Nonetheless, the extent of power rate subsidy given through 
cheaper electricity to households and other users outside the MERALCO franchise area remains 
unresolved. This is hindered by the lack of large industrial users in rural areas which can 
provide cfoss-subsidy to small users. The practice of power cross-subsidy rates further 
complicates the peculiarities of the grid pricing policy. But it is somewhat moderated by the 
sharing of national wealth as provided for by the LGC. Pricing issues are complex and have 
wider financial, fiscal, and social implications. Thus far, rural households have benefitted to the 
extent that electricity rates have not proportionately adjusted to increases in generation and 
distribution costs and do not reflect revaluation of assets of utility distributors, whether RECs or 
private utilities.
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On institutional-arrangement issues, a number of observations can be derived. First, OEA 
should be more active and aggressive in reforming energy policy so as to improve die regulatory 
environment and act as promoter and arbitrator of BOT energy projects. It must continue to 
encourage and support the refining of die least-cost power-development program (PDP) of NPC 
and the proposed rural-electrification master plan (REMP) of NEA. There is no reason why OEA 
cannot exercise strong leadership as the abolished Ministry of Energy did. The PDP and REMP 
must clarify the locations and type of projects where private co-generators can participate, 
whether as provider of base or peaking loads, or distributors.
ERB should regulate both private utilities and NPC. (The latter’s pricing decisions are 
subject to ERB hearings.) NEA must clarify its regulatory role on RECs and reconcile it with its 
promotional role to avoid conflict of interest But it should be guided by a clearer national-policy 
statement on the role of RECs in providing rural electricity, including the appropriate financial, 
technical and pricing conditions. The expanded-area-coverage approach as a promotional policy, 
particularly in rural areas, must be reconciled with the cost-recovery principle which underlies 
sound utility pricing.
NPC and NEA must also undergo institutional strengthening and financial rehabilitation for 
the following: (a) improving their investment planning and implementation capabilities to reduce 
systems losses; (b) overhauling their pricing structure along the LRMC principle to become 
more financially viabile; and (c) raising the competence of their manpower and quality of their 
operating systems. Hie ECC will have to seek the full commitment of the national government 
through the Government Corporate Monitoring and Coordinating Committee, of NPC, and NEA 
to implement such program. The NEA bail-out plan and the preparation of the REMP and a 
similar plan for NPC are major steps in this direction. The reorganization and depoliticalization 
of NEA are addressed in the proposed Rural Electrification Act of 1991.
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ANNEX A
ERB RESOLUTION NO. 91-22
WHEREAS, on January 21, 1987, the President and the Cabinet 
approved a set of policy reforms for the power sector, which, among 
other things, mandated the establishment of technical and financial 
indicators and standards to be used as bases for determining the 
continuance or discontinuance of direct power connection of 
industries to the National Power Corporation;
WHEREAS, the Energy Coordinating Council (ECC) subsequently 
endorsed to the Energy Regulatory Board, for adoption and 
implementation, a set of financial and technical standards which 
had been formulated in consultation with various government and 
private agencies/entities concerned;
WHEREAS, the Board has requested various industries/groups, 
which will be affected by these financial and technical standards 
particularly those that are directly connected to the National 
Power Corporation (NPC), to submit their respective comments/views 
thereon for consideration by the Board;
WHEREAS, there is an absolute need to adopt and implement 
these standards in order to facilitate the determination of the 
power distributors qualified to service large industrial customers 
and, consequently, the transfer of said large industrial loads 
directly connected to NPC to the local electric distributors under 
this Board's jurisdiction.
NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved, as this Board hereby resolves, 
to adopt and implement, AS IT HEREBY ADOPTS AND IMPLEMENTS, the 
following financial and technical standards for electric utilities 
under the Board's jurisdiction to be used as bases for determining 
whether direct connection of industry to NPC is no longer necessary 
in the franchise area of the specific electric utility, together 
with the prescribed data monitoring format:
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I . FINANCIAL STANDARDS
Section 1. Definition of Financial Indicators.
1. Outstanding Debt to NPC (ODNPC): Total outstanding or 
overdue accounts to NPC excluding restructured debts and 
receivables from government accounts.
Standard is set at no outstanding debt to NPC.
2. Debt Service Capability Ratio (DSCR):
Net Income (before interest) 
plus Non-Cash Charges
DSCR = -------------------------------
Interest plus Principal Payments 
on All Loans
Standard is at least 1.25
3. Operating Expense Ratio (OER):
Operating Expenses plus Cost of 
Available Power less Taxes
OER = -----------------------------------
Revenues from Sale of Electricity
Standard is 95 Percent or less.
4. Average Collection Period (ACP):
Customers Accounts Receivables
less Government Accounts 365
ACP “  x days
Revenues from Sale of Electricity
Standard is 45 Days or less.
Section 2. Weights are given to the different financial
standards since the different financial indicators 
are not of equal importance in the determination of 
financial capabilities of electric utilities in 
taking over industries directly connected to NPC, 
viz;
INDICATORS STANDARDS WEIGHTS
ODNPC
DSCR
NOODNPC
1.25 or more
50%
25%
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OER 95% or less 10%
ACP 45 days or less 15%
In order to pass the financial standards, utilities should at 
least obtain a 75% passing mark. Those that do not pass one of the 
above standards must be within 10% of the standards.
II. TECHNICAL STANDARDS
SECTION 1. Efficiency standards are set for private
utilities. Minimum and preferred standards 
are given, with the preferred standard to
serve as targets that must be achieved within 
a reasonable period of time.
SECTION 2. Percentage system losses is defined as:
( Total Kwh Sales )
% System Losses = ( 1 ) x 100%
( Net System Input (Kwh) )
Where:
Net System Input = Purchased Power plus Utility
Generation less Utility's Own Use
SECTION 3. Standards for Private Utilities
% Power Losses
Minimum Standard 14%
Preferred Standard 10%
III. IMPLEMENTATION
Section 1. (a) On the issue of direct power connection to
NPC, primary consideration shall be given to the 
technical capability of electric distributors to 
serve large industrial loads, the financial and 
technical standards shall serve as secondary 
considerations for the transfer of directly 
connected industries to franchised distributors.
(b) These financial and technical standards shall 
gradually be implemented, allowing for a transition 
period of one year from the effectivity thereof. 
Within this period, electric distributors are 
expected to attain at least the minimum standard of 
efficiency, as well as the financial benchmarks 
presented.
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(c) The preferred standard of efficiency should 
largely be met in 5 years time from the adoption of 
the minimum standards. Efforts towards this end 
should be coupled with continuous government 
incentives and penalties, as well as strict 
monitoring and implementation of financial and 
technical standards.
These standards shall be reviewed regularly to guarantee the 
continued applicability and usefulness of the approved performance 
measures and benchmarks.
IV. DATA MONITORING AND COLLECTION FORMAT
Section 1. To ensure data consistency across all
distributing utilities, the attached data
monitoring and collection format is hereby
prescribed for compliance by all utilities
concerned.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the
agencies/entities concerned for their information and guidance.
This resolution shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its 
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the country.
Pasig, Metro Manila, December 6, 1991.
(SGD) REX V. TANTIONGCO 
Chairman
(SGD) ALEJANDRO B. AFURONG (SGD) OSCAR E. ALA
Member Member
(SGD) ARNALDO P. BALDONADO 
Member
(SGD) BAYANI V. FAYLONA 
Member
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Annex B
Major Economic Relations Affecting Klectric Power Generation and Distribution
Bsgnlatory4rsa
Exploration and development 
instrument
Activity/Condition
1. Energy Resource Developnent
a. Participants United 
to at least 407 
Pilipino corporations
b. Service contracting through 
co-production, joint venture 
and production sharing when 
natural resources are explored, 
extracted and developed
2. Electric Power Generation
a. Co-generation by private entities Entry and ownership licensing 
subject to interconnection and 
power off-take agreement with 
NPC, i.e.. ninimwiload and fuel 
pricing
Regulatory Lew, 
Rales and Policies
Entry and ownership licensing 1987 Constitution, RA 7042
b. Securing of franchise to operate - do -
c. Environmental clearance, setting Certificate to operate 
up of environnental fund, and 
econonic and financial viability
d. ODA, BO! incentives, goveraseat 
subsidies and financing
Access to fiscal incentive, 
tax subsidies and credit
e. Prohibition of government guarantee Access to credit 
of private debts
1987 Constitution, PD 87, 
PD 1875
EO 215
1987 Constitution, RA 8997 
PR 1588, RA 7160
10 226, EO 93, IEDA Board 
(Oet. 9, 1991 decision)
EO 215. RA 6957
Regulators
Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), Board 
of Isvestueito (BOI)
Office of Ksergy Affaire 
(OEA). SBC
Batioaal Power Corporation 
(■PC). 0IA, Energy Regulatory 
Board (ERB)
OEA, Congress
Regional Development Councils 
(RDCs), Environmental Manage­
ment Korean (EMB), local 
communities, IKDA Board
BO!. PIBB, DBF. BBC
Department of Finance, Central 
Bank
f. NPC operation Utility operating standards BA 8395, PD 40, Loan agreements Office of the Proeident
GCNCC Creditors
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a. Setting up of rural electric Entry and operation 
cooperatives and private utilities
b. Direct connection to NPC of large Utility operation 
indnstries with loads of at least
2 KB and 69 IV sore
3, Electric Poser Distribution
c. Financial operation of electric 
utility distributors
4. Electric Poser Pricing
a. NPC Grid Pricing
b. Electricity pricing by private 
electric utilities
c. Attainaent of niniuui rate 
of return
5. Liquidation and Disposition 
of Assets
Taxation, i.e., payient 
of local franchise tax 
and share of national 
wealth to local governaents 
Technical operating standards
Differentiated pricing by grid 
and sinilar pricing of each 
custoaer within each grid
Output pricing
Cost Recovery
CA 146. RA 6308 as aaended by 
RA 269. RA 6938
BOI-IPC-NIA Agroeaent
Internal Revenue Code, RA 7160
ERB Resolution No. 91-92. 
HEC/NEDA Standards
RA 6395
Ett Resolution No. 91-92. 
NBA Standards
ERB Resolution No. 91-92. 
RA 6395. PD 40 and loan 
agreeaents
Loan agreeaents/covenants Sitb 
creditorsa. NPC and other electric utilities Exit
NIC. REA. ERB 
BOI, ERB, REA, RPC
DOF, ISOs
EBB. REA
RPC, ERB
ERB, REA
RPC, ERB. NEC 
Creditors
SC. Creditors
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Table 3
Gross Energy Generation by Grid and by Energy Source, 1980-90 
(in million kilowatt hours)
1980 1961 1982 1983 1964 1965 1986 1967 1968 1989 1990
PHILIPPINES 15086 15988 17413 16682 18666 18757 19263 AMQE 22944 24087 24799
Oil-Based 9507 9494 10016 11514 8538 6713 6970 9183 9546 10076 11541
Hydro 3502 3724 3751 2964 5167 5514 5989 5235 6212 6473 6047
Geothermal 2077 2770 3586 4093 4540 4945 4586 4516 4842 5316 5470
Coal 0 0 60 111 423 1585 1718 2061 2344 2223 1741
GENERATION MIX (% ) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Oil-Based 63.0 59.4 57.5 61.6 45.7 35.8 36.2 43.7 41.6 42.0 46.5
Hydro 23.2 233 21.5 15.9 27.7 29.4 31.1 249 27.1 27.0 27.4
Geothermal 13.8 17.3 20.6 21.9 24.3 26.4 23.8 21.5 21.1 22.0 22.1
Coal 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.6 2.3 8.4 8 9 9 9 10.2 9.0 7.0
LUZON 13115 13666 14398 15294 14655 14449 14756 16030 17439 18222 18822
Oll-Basad 9173 8894 9011 10145 7787 5825 6328 8376 8829 9150 10328
Hydro 1673 2033 1832 1274 2519 2869 £930 1961 2588 2599 2370
Geothermal 2069 2739 3555 3875 4125 4284 3900 3710 4024 4495
Coal 0 0 0 0 224 1471 1572 1983 1998 2029 1629
VISAYAS 321 503 777 1057 1177 1343 1467 1693 1876 1999 2051
Oil-Based 304 464 676 719 551 561 624 800 703 922 955
Hydra 9 8 10 9 12 7 11 9 9 11 9
Geothermal 8 31 31 218 415 661 688 806 818 872 975
Coal 0 0 60 111 199 114 146 78 346 194 112
CEBU GRID 178 257 439 503 516 478 542 638 737 808 804
Oil-Based 178 257 379 392 317 364 396 560 391 614 692
Coal 0 0 60 111 199 114 146 78 346 194 112
NEGROS GRID 35 100 151 203 220 244 260 323 381 422 463
Oil-Based 26 77 126 146 58 0 1 0 0 0 0
Hydro 4 3 3 3 4 3 4 2 2 3 2
Geothermal 3 20 22 54 158 241 255 321 379 419 461
PANAY GRID 84 112 112 135 134 150 173 200 238 241 215
Oil-Based 84 112 112 135 134 150 173 200 238 241 215
LE Y TE  GRID */ 5 11 48 187 278 441 457 490 474 476 514
OH-Based 0 0 39 23 21 21 26 5 35 23 0
Geothermal 5 11 9 164 257 420 431 485 439 453 514
BOHOL GRID 19 23 27 29 29 30 35 42 46 52 55
Oil-Based 14 18 20 23 21 28 28 35 39 44 48
Hydra 5 5 7 6 8 4 7 7 7 8 7
MINDANAO 1650 1819 2238 2331 2834 2965 3040 3272 3629 3866 3926
Oil-Based 30 136 329 650 198 327 18 7 14 3 258
Hydro 1620 1683 1909 1681 2638 2638 3022 3265 3615 3883 3668
AG U S GRID 1622 1759 2169 2255
Oil-Based 2 76 260 574
Hydro 1620 1683 1909 1681
ISOLATED GRIDS 26 60 69 76
Oil-Based 28 60 69 76
*/ Reflect* Leyte-Samar system starting 1986.
Source: National Power Corporation (NPC).
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Table 4
Energy Sales by Grid and by Customer Type, 1980-90 
(in million kilowatt hours)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
PHILIPPINES 14033 14918 16000 17083 17089 17140 17645 19337 21180 22244 22915
Utilities 11506 12337 13353 14356 13813 13804 14213 15658 17291 18219 19242
Industries 2037 2048 2213 2445 2793 2872 2955 3173 3330 3509 3326
Misc. Load 490 533 434 268 395 464 477 506 559 516 347
S A LE S  MIX (% ) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Utilities 82 83 83 84 81 81 81 81 81 62 84
Industries 15 14 14 14 17 17 17 16 16 16 15
Misc. Load 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 1
LU ZO N 12164 12690 13126 13908 13245 13136 13461 14720 16078 16795 17368
Utilities 10496 10970 11579 12457 11739 11632 11915 13033 14269 14915 15641
Industries 1185 1205 1134 1180 1123 1049 1075 1188 1256 1370 1450
Misc. Load 483 515 413 271 383 455 471 499 553 510 277
VISAYAS 292 456 700 933 1020 1173 1261 1490 1644 1768 1818
Utilities 241 363 517 657 667 743 892 1082 1248 1373 1393
Industries 48 89 178 270 349 426 365 403 392 391 357
Misc. Load 3 4 5 6 4 4 4 5 4 4 68
C E B U  GRID 163 240 395 461 465 433 466 573 650 718 725
Utilities 116 150 219 284 296 316 424 510 584 643 648
Industries 46 88 174 175 167 115 40 61 64 73 32
Misc. Load 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 45
N E G R O S  GR ID 32 82 142 176 174 196 207 268 322 360 362
Utilities 31 81 140 162 151 181 195 254 308 346 343
Industries O 0 1 13 22 14 11 13 14 13 18
Misc. Load 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
P AN A Y G RID 75 105 101 122 123 134 156 182 214 224 231
Utilities 75 105 101 122 123 134 156 182 214 224 231
Industries 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Misc. Load 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
L E Y T E  GRID*/ 5 11 40 148 234 384 401 429 416 419 449
Utilities 4 9 36 64 74 88 89 102 104 117 145
Industries 0 0 2 82 159 295 311 328 311 302 304
Misc. Load 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
B O H O L G R ID 17 20 23 26 24 26 31 38 42 47 51
Utilities 14 18 21 24 23 24 28 34 38 43 27
Industries 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3
Misc. Load 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 21
M INDAN AO 1577 1772 2174 2248 2741 2831 2923 3127 3458 3681 3729
Utilities 769 1004 1257 1242 1407 1429 1406 1543 1774 1931 2208
Industries 804 754 902 995 1326 1397 1515 1582 1682 1748 1519
Misc. Load 4 14 15 11 8 5 2 2 2 2 2
*/ Reflects Leyte-Samar grid starting 1986.
Source; National Power Corporation.
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